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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

In this case, the district court quieted title to certain property in Appellants ("Iiarris" or
"the Harrises"), and found that a governmental taking had occurred under the doctrine of inverse
condemnation, yet the court denied Harris all compensation, damages, and attorneys' fees for the
taking, finding that Harris had waived those rights. The rulings quieting title and finding a taking
were not appealed. This appeal is centered on the rulings that deny Iiarris their just
compensation, damages, fees, and any other remuneration to which they are entitled as a result of
the taking.
B.

Statement of Facts

As with illost property law cases, understanding the history of the property and those
circumstances giving rise to the litigation is helpful. In this particular case, that history reaches
hack many years and involves Idaho's mining statutes, Idaho Department of Lands ("the
Department") policies and procedures and the State Board of Land Commissioners ("the Land
Board"), the executive committee which oversees that Department and all of its activities relative
to the sale and lease of state land. The history and facts relevant to these proceedings are not in
dispute and are set forth below.

1.

Facts re la tin^ To Harris's Property

I-Iarris bought certain property (hereinafter "the Forty Acres") in 1980 under a Personal
Representative's Deed from the estate of Matilda Riley.' The Rileys acquired their interest in the
property in 1951 by an assignment from Frank Wilken. Mr. Wilken had purchased the Forty

'

R. Vol 1, p. 42 (Harris's Deed); p. 43 (1949 State of Idaho Land Sale Certificate to Frank Wilken); p. 44 (1971
State of Idaho Deed to William A. Riley Estate).
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Acres from the State of Idaho in 1949 under a certificate of land sale and then assigned his
interest to William Riley in 1951. In 1971, the last payment was made on the certificate and the
State of Idaho issued a deed for the Forty Acres to the Estate of William Riley. Harris used
portions of the Forty Acres as pasture and part of it as a rock quarry to help subsidize Harris's
farming operations.z Over the years, Harris had sold sand and gravel to numerous customers,
including the Latah County Highway District3
In 1985, the Department contacted Harris and told him that he was trespassing on state
land.4 Appellees (hereinafter referred to as "the State" or "the Department") had recently
determined that it, rather than Harris, was the owner of the sand and gravel on the Forty Acres
The State refused to
and that Iiarris must reimburse the State for past sand and gravel ren~oval.~
allow Harris use of or access to the sand and gravel on the Forty Acres without signing a lease
agreement with the ~ t a t e .In~ September, 1985, Paul Keeton, a family friend and legislator was
I-Iarris asked Keeton to talk with the State representative
going to Boise on legislative bu~iness.~
Mr. Keeton met with Linda Lou Johnson, an employee
concerning the State's recent de~nands.~
~ Keeton's affidavit,
of the Bureau of Minerals in the Department, as a favor to ~ a r r i s .Mr.
including the letter he wrote to Harris after the meeting, is the only evidence in the record
concerning this meeting.

lo

Iiis sworn statement concerning how and why this meeting was

arranged, and what transpired is the sole source of information on this event and it is

2

R. Vol. IV, p. 748 (First Affidavit of Sharon Harris).
See, inka., fn. 9 1.
9.
Vo. 111, p. 592
5
R. Vol. 111, ~ ~ 5 7 7 , 5 9591,
0 , 593, 594.
6
Id; R. Vol. IV, pp. 637-38
7
R. Vol. IV, p. 748,744-745
8
R. Vol. IV, p. 748, 744-745,753-755
9
R. Vol. IV, p. 745
'O R. Vol. IV, p. 744 (Affidavit of Paul Keeton);and 754-755 (Letter to Harris).
3
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uncontroverted.ll In fact, the State itself relies on the letter Mr. Keeton sent Harris after the
meeting for what was said at the meeting.''
During that meeting, Ms. Johnson told Mr. Keeton that the State was certain of its
ownership of the sand and gravel on the Forty Acres. "' he

indicated that legal battles over sand

and gravel ownership based on the reservation of "minerals" in sales of state land in which the
state's land sale contract reserved "minerals" from the transaction had already been fought and
won by the State. She represented that the State had researched the question of ownership of
sand and gravel extensively and that the State was "quite sure" that in a situation such as
Harris's, where the deed issued in 1971 had a typed- in addition to the mineral reservation
stating "including sand and travel" but the land sale certificate had no such reservation, the

State was entitled to royalties; that she knew of no case where the 'minerals' sand and gravel had
been released to the land owner upon request; and that she was sure the Board of Land
Commissioners would not release their claim to the sand and gravel in Harris's case. She
threatened that if I-Iarris did not sign a lease before removing sand and gravel, the State would
double their fees for negligent trespass and triple their fee for willful trespass. Ms. Johnson told
Mr. Keeton that Harris would face lawsuits for trespass, stoppage of rock removal activity, backpayments, interest, and fines and penalties if they did not cooperate and sign a lease.I4 Mr.
Keeton relayed Ms. Johnson's statements back to Harris. His sworn statement enunciates "I met
with Ms. Johnson in my capacity as a member of the Legislature.. . I had no reason to believe
that what Ms. Johnson was telling me was ...not to be fully accepted as correct. I relied entirely

"
IV, pp. 744-46 and 747-55
'* R.R. Vol.
VoI. Vl, pp. 1032-1033
'' R. Vol. IV, pp 753-755
14

Id. ; andsee R. Vol. IV, pp. 637-38.
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on what Ms. Johnson said to report back to the IHarrises..."I5

2.

Facts Relating To The State's Claim of Ownershim

Crucial to the State's defense throughout this case (and the basis of its counterclaim) has
been its claim that it either was, in fact, the rightful owner of the sand and gravel or that it had a
legitimate and good faith belief that it was. The undisputed facts relevant to these claims are as
follows:

In 1937, when asked by the Land Department whether "gravel, in the ordinary sense, was
considered a mineral, Idaho Attorney General J.W. Taylor advised, ". .. within the meaning of
section 46-7011the predecessor to I.C. $47-701jn, that gravel "does not come under the terms of
the act."I6

In 1958, the State intervened in a lawsuit in which the State's right to sand and gravel
under a mineral reservation was at issue. Winchester v. Beshey, No. 13362, Seventh Judicial
District, Canyon County, 1958. The State did not appeal tlie decision of the Seventh Judicial
District that sand and gravel were not "minerals" as the term was used in tlie State's mineral
reservation pursuant to I.C. § 47-701.

Also in 1958, the Department itself made the

recommendation to the Land Board that when land sale certificates have been issued that do not
specifically name sand and gravel as reserved by the State, "the deed of convevance also not
show such a reservation to the state."I7

In 1962, the State again lost its claim to a reservation of sand and gravel as "minerals"
pursuant to I.C. $ 47-70], Crystal v. State, No. 5676, Twelfth Judicial District, Fremont County,

"
"

R. Vol. IV, pp. 744-745 and pp. 753-55.
see R. Vot. 11, p. 245 (identification and summary of certain undisputed State records presented to the Idaho
Supreme Court in the Treasure Valley case).
R. p. Vol. IV, p. 71 1.The deed issued by the State in 1971 to the estate of William Riley did a t , however,
comply with this recommendation. The reservation of mineral language of the deed does not match the contract.
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1962. There too, the court found that "the reservation of mineral rights to the State of Idaho does
~l
not include earth, rock, sand and gravel and the State of Idaho does not have any l a w f ~ right,
title, interest or claim in or to the earth, rock, sand and gravel located on [the plaintiffs
property.]" The State did not appeal.
In 1964, after the State lost the two legal battles over whether sand and gravel were

reserved "minerals", the State began to type the phrase "including sand and gravel" into state
land sale contract forms.'8
In 1972, the Board of Land Cominissioners directed the Department of Lands to "correct"

deeds by deleting from them any reference to sand and gravel if the original land sale certificate
did not specifically identify sand and gravel as reserved to the state.''

~otwithstandin~
the

Department's disregard of this fact in this case, it was the State's clear and unequivocal policy,
commencing in 1972, not to assert ownership of sand and gravel whenever the certificate of sale
did not reserve those materials."
In 1979, the Chief of the Minerals Bureau of the Department instructed his staff that

"[oln sales prior to 16 June 1964 the specific language ['including sand, gravel and pumice'] was
not included [in the land sale certificate]; Board Policy on this matter is that deeds issued upon
satisfied sale contracts devoid of the specific language quoted will have the specific language

struckfrom the deed,f~rm."~'The phrase "including sand and gravef" was struck from numerous

l9
'O

See R. Vol. V, p. 926 andR. Vol. 11, p. 241-42 (March 29, 1984, letter from Deputy Attorney General Rinda Ray
Just to Stanley Hamillon).
R. Vol. I1 pp. 246-47 (These steps were also part of the undisputed record in the Treasure Valley appeal, infra. at
p.12); R. Vol. IV, p. 786; R. Vol. V. p. 926
See R. Vol. I, p. 72 (State's Answer and Counterclaim) and Vol. IV, pp. 146-147 (State's Response to Request
for Admission No. 4, in Treasure Valley case, infra. p. 12)
R. Vol. IV, pp. 783-84 (emphasis added.)
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State of Idaho deeds in order to comply with this

It is undisputed that in some counties,

such as Cassia County, at least 81% of the deeds issued by the State between 1972 and 1984 had
the language "including sand and gravel" struck from them in order to keep the deed resei-vation
consistent with the terms ofthe land sale ~ertificate.'~
In 1981, the State legislature expressly declined legislation proposed by the Department
From at
of Lands to add sand and gravel as a mineral reserved to the State under I.C. 5 47-701.~~
least 1974 to 1993, plat maps and land ownership records maintained by the State of Idaho and
available for public inspection, explicitly stated that State of Idaho deeds with reservations of
minerals pursuant to Idaho Code 47-701 did not include sand, gravel or pumice.25
On February 8, 1984, Bob Becker, attorney for the Department, met with the Land

Board concerning sand and gravel policy issues.26 Becker reminded the board of a situation
presented to it in 1972 in which the private landowner objected to the State's claim of ownership
where the certificate of land sale did not specifically reserve sand and gravel but on a
subsequently issued deed it was typed in. "The Board stated /in 19721 that from that time
forward, sand and gravel would not be reserved unless the land sale certificate specifically
reserved sand and

In spite of this clear directive, however, Becker informed the Land

Board that the two bureaus of the Department (Bureau of Minerals and Bureau of Lands) had
been administering sand and gravel differently. In a memo to the Land Board Becker wrote:
Unfortunately, this Land Board policy has not been applied uniformly within the
See, fn: 2, supra; R. Vol. I, pp. 150-51, 152-53 (State's Responses to RFAs 9 and 13 in Treasure Valley, infra.
p 12).
23 Id., p. 156-57 (State's Response to RFA 19 in Treasure Valley, infra. p. 12).
24 For a full legislative history of I.C. 5 47-701, Harris asks this court to take judicial notice of the briefs filed with
the Supreme Court in Treasure V a l l q Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 978 P.2d 233 (1999), a portion of
which has been provided at R. Vol. I, pp. 125-90 and R. Vol. 11, pp. 233-51. .See also, R. Vol. V, pp. 923-24.
25 R. Vol. Il, p. 249 (State's Appellate Brief in Treasure Valley case) and R. Vol. IV, p. 786.
2G R. Vol. V, p. 926
" Id.
22

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 7

Department. The Bureau of Minerals continued, up to June 1983, to treat sand
and gravel as reserved minerals, notwithstanding the Land Board's directive in
1972. . . . The Bureau of lands, on the other hand, has been applying the 1972
Board policy since that date. Where the original land sale certificate did not
contain a specific reservation of sand and gravel, the Bureau of Lands crossed out
the specific reservation on a subsequently issued deed. . .
But the Bureau of Minerals (the agency for which Linda Lou-Johnson worked) did not
comply with the Land Board directive:
In summary, ua to June, 1983, the Bureau o f Minerals treated sand and nravel
as reserved mineral regardless o f the reservation language in the land sale
certificate and/or deed and contrarv to Land Board policv set in 1972 where, the
Bureau ofLands has followed Land Board policy. 29
Becker urged the Land Board to insist on the Bureau of Minerals' compliance with Land Board
policy and recommended that the Land Board continue to apply its policy that sand and gravel is
not reserved unless the certificate of land sale specifically reserved them3'
In March of 1984, then-Deputy Attorney General Rinda Ray Just sent a letter to the

Director of the Department, Stanley Hamilton, in response to his request for the Attorney
General's legal advice on these

Hamilton asked, in effect, what the legal odds were in

pursuing a claim of ownership to sand and gravel where the land sale certificate did not
specifically reserve them. Ms. Just gave a long and detailed response, advising that the State's
claim to ownership was "dubious at best."32 Ms. Just pointed out that H.B. 354 was introduced
in 1981 in an attempt to "effectuate the 1964 land board policy of reserving sand and gravel for
the state", but the Legislature rejected the bill. She advised the Department that this rejection
was "strong evidence the legislature intended that sand, gravel, and pumice not be considered

28

29

30
3'

"

R. Vol. IV, pp. 785-87 at p. 786
R. Vol. IV, pp. 785-87 (emphasis added).
Id

R. Vol. 11, pp. 235-43 (MS. Just's letter was produced by the State in discovery in Treasure Valley, infia.p. 12 )
Id. at 238,237.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 8

minerals and not be statutorily reserved."33 With respect to the specific question of whether the
State would have a claim of ownership where the State's claim was based on the general mineral
reservation of Idaho Code

5

47-701, she reminded the Department of the prior unsuccessful

lawsuits and advised that sand and gravel "would not be minerals and would not be reserved
under the statute".34 Finally, and most critical to this case, Ms. Just addressed the legal strength
of a deed which purported to reserve sand and gravel where the sale document, the land sale
certificate, had not. She advised the Department that, in such circumstances, the State's claim of
ownership was not supported by the law:
to reserve sand and
In Idaho, the land board policy evidences a clear intent
gravel unless the reservation was specifically in the land sale certificate and the
deed. Therefore, if a court were to look to the intent of tile parties, it likely would
find that sand and gravel were not reserved unless specifically included in both
the contract and the deed." 35
Ms. Just further informed Mr. Hamilton that "the policy of the land board that sand and gravel
will not be reserved unless done so specifically has just that effect-no reservation unless such
language is present in the contract and deed."3"hereafter,

the Land Board adopted an

emergency rule in August, 1984 allowing the Department to issue disclaimers to any state
interest in sand and gravel under specified circ~mstances."~'It was the policy of the Department
to strictly adhere to the legal advice given by Ms. Just in her letter.38

In 1986, Title 47, Chapter 7 was amended to reserve to the state, for the first time,
"saleable minerals" in sales of state land. That term was defined prospectively to include "sand

33
34

35

36
37
38

Id. at 240.
Id.at241.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 243.
R. Vo1. V., pp. 923-24 (emphasis added).
R. Vol. IV, pp. 788-89.
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and gravel."39 In that same year, the Director of the Department wrote a letter stating that
attempts by Bureau of Minerals employee Linda Lou Johnson to force a lease under similar
circumstances to those presented here were unauthori~ed.~~

3.

Facts Relating To The Mineral Lease

In spite of the 1958 recommendations of the Department, the advice of the Department's
attorney and the Attorney General's Office, explicit Land Board directives, and ultimately, and
enactment of I. C. 47-701A, in February of 1986, the State notified Harris that, if they did not
sign a lease, the State would lease the sand and gravel directly to Harris's existing customer the
South Latah Highway District, leaving Harris out of the loop entirely with respect to access and
use of their own surface estate and with respect to payment for the sand and gravel r e m ~ v e d . ~ '
Linda Lou Johnson informed Harris:
Your alternatives are to:
1. Secure the lease in your name and set up an agreement with the
Highway District. .. As our lessee you can also sell to any number of
customers interested in the purchase of your material.

2. The South Latah Highway District can lease the site directly from
the state. You, as surface owner, would have an agreement based on the
loss of your surface estate. As lessee, the Highway District would control
the sale of all the material from this site.
Relying on Ms. Johnson's statements, and fearing the power of the government
threatened against them, Harris signed a promissory note agreeing to pay the State $5,000.00 plus
interest for sand and gravel removed by Harris since 1980 and also signed the State's ten-year
"Mineral Lease" on April 1, 1986 (this lease, and the renewal lease signed in 1996 are

39

"
41

I.C. $5 47-701. -701A.
R. Vol. IV, pp. 788-89; 790-91
R. Vol. 111, pp 593- 594 (Letter from Linda Lou Johnson to Douglas I-larris, dated Feb. 5, 1986).
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collectively referred to herein as "the Mineral Lease" or "lease").42 Harris's uncontroverted
affidavit states that the Mineral Lease was signed in 1986 as a result of Linda Lou Johnson's
representations.43 Ms. Johnson told Harris that if they ignored the State's demands, they would
be sued for all amounts Harris ever received for sand and gravel from third parties, they would he
denied future access to their property, and they would be sued for trespass on "State" land.44
The Mineral Lease, a pre-printed State form,45provided in the opening paragraph that the
Board of Land Commissioners, granted to the "lessee, in consideration of rents and royalties to
be paid" exclusive right and privilege to mine for the specified minerals, "sand and gravel", on
the "leased premises." The "leased premises" were identified as all of the Forty Acres. The
Mineral Lease granted the lessee the right to build roads, plants, buildings, communication lines,
and reservoirs on so much of the surface of the Forty Acres as is necessary "for all purposes
reasonably incident to prospecting for ...production, refining, . . . marketing of said.
minerals . . . ." and "the full enjoyment of the purpose of the lease."46
The Mineral Lease also provided for forfeiture if the lessee failed to comply wit11 any of
its terms or "such other provisions as may be provided by the Board" from time to time
throughout the lease, or failed to pay rent or royalty as it was unilaterally adjusted from time to
time by the State. Section 16 further provided that if the Mineral Lease was obtained through
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation by the lessee, the Mineral Lease was ipsofacto null and void.
On the last page of the Mineral Lease, in the second-to-last paragraph, Section 27 states:

TITLE: Lessor makes no representation or warranty whatsoever with
respect to its title to said leased premises and lessee shall be solely responsible
42

R. Vol. IV, p. 749; R. Vol. I, p. 45-58
R. Val. IV, pp. 747-55.
u
Id. at 749,754-755.
" 5 Val. IV, p. 638.
" R. Val. I, pp. 45,50.
43
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for satisfying itself with respect to the ownership of such lands; and if
subsequently divested of said title, no liability shall be incurred by virtue of
this lease for any loss or damage to the lessee; nor shall any claim for refund
of rents or royalties therefore paid, be made by said Lessee, its successors, or
assignees.47

Additionally, the Mineral Lease contained several conditions and restrictions on Harris's use of
the surface estate of tlleiir property, and made the amount and time of payment and other elements
of performance contingent upon the Harris' success in finding buyers of the sand and
The Mineral Lease expressly prohibited "exploration requiring earth moving equipment" and
firther prohibited Harris from building on their land without advance approval of the Land
Department. The State also reserved to itself the right to permit others entry on to Harris's
property for other public purposes; and to "sell or otherwise dispose of the surface of the lands
embraced within this lease for any purpose."49 Furthermore, if the lessee refused to accept the
readjustment of terms and conditions of the lease by the Land Department during the term of the
lease, the lease could be terminated by thirty days' written notice. If the lessee did not accept
readjustment of the terms of the lease at the end of a lease term, the lessee's "preferential right"
under the lease was forfeited. . . ." 50
Between 1986 and 1999, lease terms changed and the State exercised additional and
different ownership powers over Harris's property. When the Mineral Lease was renewed in
1996, lease terms cxpanded by: 1) prohibiting entry upon the Forty Acres with motorized
equipment;s12) setting out different royalty amounts, penalties, and

47

R. Vol. I, p. 47,54
Id, pp. 45,48,56.
49
Id. pp. 102 and 103 (back sides of pages included)
so .
M
51
See R. Vol. I, p. 57.
52
R. Vol I, pp. 69-80,nl 1.15-1.24.
48
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assessment^;^^ 3) prohibiting

"subletti~~~";~%nd
5) and adding accounting requirements, inspections, and penalties for non-

4.

Facts Relating to the Termination of the Mineral Lease and
Subsequent Land Board Action

In ,1999, this Court issued its decision in Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132
Idaho 673, 978 P.2d 233 (1999). In that case, this Court held "that prior to the 1986 amendment
lof LC. 6 47-7011. the legislature did not intend for sand. gravel and ~ u m i c eto be among those
minerals reserved by the State when endowment lands were sold." (Emphasis added.) After this
decision, the Land Board once again reiterated to the Department its policy, in place since at
least 1972, that ownership of sand and gravel would not be asserted if the land sale certificate
and deed did not both specifically reserve them lo the

The Land Board furtller directed

the Department in 1999 that when questions of ownership were raised in this context, the
Department was to resolve uncertainty "in favor of the surface owners."56
On November, 22, 1999, the Department, acting under the Land Board's directions, sent a
letter to Harris unilaterally and without any contingency whatsoever, disclaiming any interest in
I-Iarris's sand and gravel and terminating the Mineral

Sharon Murray's Nov. 22, 1999

letter on behalf of the Department states:
The state issued the lease based on its belief that Idaho Code $47-701
reserved ownership o f sand nravel, basalt and pumice to the state in all
sales of endowment lands. Earlier this year, however, the Idaho Supreme
Court ruled that these minerals were not reserved under Idaho Code 647701 ulltil 1986 and therefore the state did not own sand. gravel. basalt
and pumice prior to that date. ... ."

53
54

55
56

''

Id., at 57.
Id., at 58.
R. Vol. IV, p. 642;R. Vol. 111, pp. 588; R. Vol. IV, pp. 632-33
R. VOI. IV, pp. 632-33,639-42.
R. Vol. I, pp. 59-60.
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The letter unconditionally states that "the department will no longer assert any claim of
ownership of these minerals on the lands covered by the lease" and offers to reimburse a portion
of payments received under the Mineral Lease if Harris agrees to release the State from any
future claim for damages.58 Iiarris declined the partial refund, demanding instead a full refund.
The State refu~ed.~"
In July, 2002, Department policy formally recognized the lack of State ownership of sand
and gravel where the certificate of sale and deed did not both reserve them from the sale,
providing that "the State does not hold title to sand, gravel and pumice.. . if the land sale
certificate and deed do not specifically reserve these commoditie~."~~
Department policy was to
not assert a claim of title in those circumstances "to avoid future litigation and to provide private
land owners a measure of security against potential litigation brought by the ~tate."" In a letter
to Harris dated January, 2003, the State acknowledged Harris was the only known landowner
with whom the State had not resolved the issue of sand and gravel ownership where the
certificate of land sale did not include a reservation of sand and gravel.62

C.

Course of Proceedings Below

In 2002, Harris filed this lawsuit alleging three causes of action: Quiet Title, Mesne

ProfitsiEjectmentlOuster, and Inverse Condemnation. In May, 2003, contrary to the abovedescribed executive branch policies, agency procedures, legislative action, attorney general
advice and opinions, and, this time, without the pretext of mistake, the State once again asserted
ownership over Harris's sand and gravel by filing its Counterclaim to quiet title. In defiance of
the extensive history to the contrary, the State based its claim and it defenses on outright

ss Id.
59

60

"

VOI. I. pp. 61-64
R. Voi. IV, p. 642.
R. Val. IV, pp. 632-33,639-42.

6h.
Vol. IV, p. 639.
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ownership based on the original contract of sale of the Forty Acres to Frank Wilken in 1949 and
the 1971 State deed to the Estate of ~ i l e ~ . ~ ~

1.

Harris's Quiet Title Claim

The district court initially granted summary judgment to the State on the State's
counterclaim to quiet title to the sand and gravel in its favor. However, prior to entering the
order, on August 29, 2003, the district court voided its ruling and requested additional argument.
On October 29, 2003, after an additional hearing, the court granted summary judgment to Harris

on their quiet title cause of action.64 The Court ordered reformation of the deed deleting the
phrase "including sand and gravel" from the reservation language of the deed to Riley's estate.65
In its written order, the court noted that I-larris' claim for damages relating to the quiet title action
and other claims for relief under the Complaint had yet to be decided.66
Harris next filed a motion for summary judgment seeking damages and equitable relief on
the quiet title cause of action, claiming reimbursement of money paid to the State plus prejudgment interest." Harris also requested damages in the form of fair rental value for the period
in which the State usurped Harris's ownership rights on the Forty Acres. Harris argued these
damages should be proven at trial whereas the value of the sums already paid was readily
ascertainable and liquidated.68 The Court denied all relief, however, finding that the Mineral
Lease -specifically Section 27- was unambiguously intended by both parties to serve "in the
nature of a quit claim deed" from Harris to the State, and thus, Harris had contracted away their
right to recovery. The court said:
63

R. Vol. I, pp. 75,77; 'Tr. pp. 42-44.
6+r. p. 44, L. 22 to p. 45, L. 15.
" R. Vol. IV, p. 742.
66 R. Vol. 11, p. 3 13-14.
67
These totaled $106,478.65 as of 03/25/04; R. Vol. 111, p. 550-554; rrndsee R. Vol. IV pp. 720-727
68 See R. Vol. 111, p. 462.
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The way I read 27 is put up or shut up. You have--your clients have ihe
obligation to spealc now or forever hold your peace. And if you don't speak now,
you don't get to come into court however many years later, 18 years after the fact,
aftcr the initial entry of that lease and say oh, Kings X, we didn't really mean
what we said when we signed the agreement.69
I realize there are two schools of though on contract interpretation, but if someone
has signed an agreement that is disadvantageous to them, it is of no great
consequence to me. I f . . . the provision is clear on its face. I think it's clear on its
face. It says we have doubts about our title. It's in the nature of a quit claim
deed. We have doubts about the title, and we're making no representations about
our claim to that title, and if you pay us, we're not going to give you the money
back.70
According to the district court, whether Harris lcnew what he was signing or intended the "quit
claim" of Section 27, was irrelevant. By signing the Mineral Lease, the court held, Harris
"awarded the State the right to sand and gravel."7'
On July 20, 2004, the district court entered an order granting Harris's motion, in part, for
summary judgment to quiet title. The court found that Harris was at all times the sole and
exclusive owner of the sand and gravel on their property.72 The order required that the deed be
reformed to exclude any reference to sand and gravel, but the court denied all other relief sought
by Harris. The district court ruled that although "both parties were operating under the mistaken
impression that the State had the ability to do what it was doing",

73

Harris was a "victim of his

own conscious ignorance."74

2.

Zlarris's Claimfor EjectmenUOusterMesne Profits

The Court's July 20, 2004 Order also, sua sponte, disposed of Harris's second cause of
action based on ouster and ejectment, stating it was granting the State's motion for summary
Tr. p. 83, L. 19 top. 84, L. I .
~ d .p., 87, L. 19 to p. 88, L. 5 (emphasis added)
7'
R. Vol. IV, p. 980.
72 R. Vo1. IV, p. 730-742
7"~.
p.92, LL 14-16
74 R. Vol. IV, p. 740.
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judgment on mesne profits.75 Despite the fact that the cross-motions for summary judgment
pertained only to quiet title damages, the district court ruled that Harris could not recover for
ouster and dispossession because a necessary element of those claims is a showing of
"wrongfulness" on the part of the ousting party. Referring baclc to the Mineral Lease, the court
agreed wit11 the State that under the Mineral Lease Harris had contractually waived their right to
pursue legal remedies for the State's dispossession and ouster of Harris's property rights. 76 The
district court opined that "because the Plaintiffs entered into the agreement with the State, they
cannot establish that the State wrongfully dispossessed them of sand and gravel." Although
neither party had argued or moved for summary judgment on Harris's claim for ouster and
ejectment, the court entered judgment on Count I1 of the Amended Complaint against Harris.
The July 20, 2004 Order caused Harris to file a Motion for Reconsideration and Motion
for ~larification.'~In the former, Harris noted that the court seemed to draw unsupported
inferences from the fact that Harris's friend met and talked with Linda Lou Jobnson. The
affidavits of Paul C Keeton and Sharon Harris were offered to show that Keeton, although an
attorney by profession, was not representing Harris in that capacity when he met with Ms.
Johnson. Furthermore, no discussions which could even remotely be construed as settlement
negotiations had ever taken place; and, the State's representations concerning ownership were the
motivation for signing the promissory note and Mineral Lease. The Court denied Harris's
motion for reconsiderati~n.~~
In its Motion for Clarification, Harris asked the court to identify which material facts
remained in controversy, whether its cause of action under Count I1 for ouster had been disposed
"
76

"
78

R. VoI. IV, p. 742
R. Vol. IV, p. 741.
R. Vol. IV, pp. 756-92 (Harris Motion for Reconsideration); R. Vol. IV, pp. 874-88 (Motion for Clarification).
R. Vol. IV p, 85 1
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of, and whether the court was denying all relief other than reformation of the deed. The Court
responded to this motion in a footnote to the August 2, 2006, Memorandum Decision, stating
simply that damages are not available in a quiet title action; solely deed r e f ~ r m a t i o n . ~ ~

3.

Harrk's Claimfor Inverse Condemnation

Iiarris's inverse condemnation claim is based on the contention that the State's taking and
retention of Plaintiffs' property for public use and benefit under the State's false claim of right,
title, and interest, constituted a "taking" in violation of the constitution of the State of Idaho, for
which Harris is entitled to just compensation.
In April of 2006, Harris filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim arguing that,
since the district court had already ruled that Harris the sole owner of the sand and gravel on their
farm, Harris was the 0111y party with the authority to control its use and disposition, therefore,
excluding Harris from the property, and forcing him to sign the Mineral Lease as the lessee and
comply with the State's rules concerning day-to-day use of the surface estate on which the sand
and gravel lay, deprived Iiarris of full ownership, use, and occupation of the property.
On August 2, 2006, the district court issued a ruling granting Harris's motion for
summary judgment on inverse condemnation finding that the State's threats forcing Harris to
sign the Mineral Lease were not in conformity with due process.80 With respect to I.C. Section
5-224, the statute of limitations, the court found that Harris's claim accrued on November 22,

1999, the date Harris first became aware of the full extent of the impairment of use.8' Thus, the
claim was within the statute. A trial date was set for June 25, 2007, on the issue of inverse
condemnation damages.

'' R. Val. V, p. 982.
R. Val. V, pp. 979 and R. Vol. V, p. 980
'' Id at 982.
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Thereafter, ihe State filed a motion for reconsideration, a motion in limine, and a motion
for clarification asking the court to reconsider its ruling and clarify the takings period. On July
25, 2007, the district court ruled on the State's motions and simultaneously entered its Judgment
in this case.82 Again, the district court reversed its prior ruling. The court ruled that Harris was
precluded from recovery on their inverse condemnation claim for the period 1986-1999 because
the terms of the Mineral Lease controlled during that period and the limitation of liability in
Section 27, was viable-post

lease-termination-as

a defense to Harris's claim for damages.

The district court also held that Idaho Code § 5-224 barred recovery for the State's taking from
1985-1986, the period prior to the Mineral Lease. In the final judgment, title was quieted in
Harris and the deed was reformed. I-Iarris's other claims for relief were denied. Only the district
court's rulings denying relief and attorneys fees were appealed.

D.

Standard of Review on Appeal

It is well-known that the standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary
judgment is the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment. Tolley v. THI Company, 140 Idaho 253,92 P.3d 503 (2004), citing Baxter v.

Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). Generally, summary judgment is only
proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Eagle Water Co., Inc. v. Roundy Pole Fence Co., 7
P.3d 1103, 1105 (Id. 2000); Bonz v. Sudweehx, 119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876 (1991). When a
court reviews a motion for summary judgment, the facts are to be liberally construed in favor of
the non-moving party and all inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Conslruction Management Systems, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America, 135 Idaho 680, 682, 23
R. Vol. VI at pp. 1106.1 113
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P.3d 142, 144 (2001); Eagle Water Co., Inc. v. Roundy Pole Fence Co., 7 P.3d 1103, 1105
(2000). The Supreme Court will review entwined questions of law and fact, exercising free
review over questions of law and uphold factual findings supported by substantial and competent
evidence. Ada County Ifigkway Disl. v. Total Success, 179 P.3d 323 (Id. 2008), citing Marshall
v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,679,946 P.2d 975,979 (1997) (emphasis added)

ISSUES ON APPEAL

11.

111.

A.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Harris just compensation for the
Department's taking of their sand and gravel rights from 1985-2007.

B.

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that Harris is precluded from recovery for
the taking which occurred between 1985 and 1986 by operation of Idaho Code § 5224.

C.

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that although Harris prevailed on their quiet
title action, they are not entitled to relief other than reformation of a deed.

D.

Whether the District Court erred in ruling sua sponte against Harris on their claim for
ejectment and ouster.

E.

Whether the District Court erred in denying Harris's Request for Attorneys' Fees.

ARGUMENT
This case simply should not be here. First, even the State has acknowledged that "this

case presents nearly identical issues to the Treasure Valley case."83 Yet, this case has endured
six years, six motions and cross motions for summary judgment, three motions for
reconsideration, two motions for Rule 54 b certification, and three retractionslreversals by the
court of its own rulings. This case could have and should have been avoided by the Department
taking reasonable, prudent, and consistent steps concerning its land sales in the 1930's when the
State realized the definition of "mineral" may not include sand and gravel; or in the 1950's when
83

Tr. p. 143, LI. 12-15.
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the State became aware of conflicting practices in the way it was documenting state land sales
and recommended a procedure in which the deed would reflect the same terms as the land sale
contract; or in the 1960's or '70's when the issue repeatedly resurfaced in court decisions and
Land Board hearings; or in the '80s when the State's own attorneys advised it that state law and
Land Board policy did not support a claim of ownership and state legislation confirmed those
opinions; or in the 1990's when even this Court held that sand and gravel were not reserved prior
to 1986 in sales of state lands. This case is here because, contrary to seventy years of legislative
enactments, judicial decisions, Department and Land Board policy, and legal advice, the State
failed to affirmatively deal with inconsistent mineral reservation language in deeds and the
correlating land sale contracts, continued to claim ownership of sand and gravel property based
on that language, and relied on an insignificant provision in a state form to deny Harris their
constitutional rights. Even the lower court noted that "now[,] over 50 years later[,] an effort to
try to, after the fact, reconstruct and reconstitute the certificate of sale and the deed . . . strikes me
as too little and too late."8"
Once the Court determined Harris was the owner of the sand and gravel, and that the
State's exercise of ownership over that property from 1985 to 2007 constituted a taking under the
doctrine of inverse condemnation, the laws of eminent domain and the constitution of this state
require that Harris be justly compensated. The district court, however, refused to award damages
or just compensation because, it ruled, the Mineral Lease insulated the State from all claims
against it. Because Harris signed the Mineral Lease, thereby acquiescing in the State's mistake,
Harris was contractually barred from recovering damages or compensation of any nature
whatsoever, not only under their cause of action for inverse condemnation, but also under their
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successful action to quiet title. Though the Department has never argued that its claiin of
ownership or insistence on the Mineral Lease was the result of mistake, the district court,
nevertheless, held that the Department was inistalcen regarding its ownership when it forced the
lease on Harris and that mistake, coupled with a limitation-of-liability provision in the Mineral
Lease, relieved the Department from any equitable or legal duty to compensate ~ a r r i s . ' ~
Harris will demonstrate in this appeal that neither Idaho law nor the evidence supports the
district court's conclusions. Harris is entitled to just compensation for the entire period the State
exercised control and ownership of their property. First, there was no mistake, in fact or law, on
the part of the State with respect to ownership at the time the State asserted such ownership
against Harris. Second, even if the State did make a mistake as to ownership, such a mistake
does not relieve it of the constitutional requirement of just compensation. Third, the existence of
the signed contract-forced

on Harris as a result of the State's alleged mistake-does not negate

the constitutional requirement of just compensation or quiet title damages and restitution
A.

The District Court Erred in Denying Harris Just Compensation for the
Department's T a k i n ~of Their Sand and Gravel R i ~ h t s

The district court was correct in its first ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment on Harris's action for inverse condemnation when he ruled that: "In this case it is
apparent that the State toolc a valuable property right from Harris without paying for it. The only
real question is whether the State's actions can be construed as being in compliance with due
process of law." Subsequently, however, the district court reversed itself (for the third time) and,
ruled: (I) "Harris's claim for inverse condemnation for the period of the mineral lease is

85
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precluded by the express language of the lease, specifically paragraph 27...";86 and (2) for the
period before the Mineral Lease, the Harris's claim is barred by I. C. § 5-224.87 This revised
decision is not supported by the law and should be reversed.
1.

The Lease Does Not Relieve The State Of The Constitutional
Obligation To Compensate For Property It Takes, Regardless Of
Whether It Is The Result Of Mistake, Error, Or Misunderstanding

The Mineral Lease cannot undo the State's "taking" of Harris's property rights. First, as the
Statement of Facts illustrates, there was no mistake, in fact or law, on the part of the State with
respect to ownership at the time it claimed the sand and gravel and insisted on the Mineral Lease
in 1986. The Department was well aware that the legislature rejected its interpretation of sand
and gravel as a mineral in 1981 when the Department proposed legislation to that eKect. By
1986, the law was clear in amendments to Title 47, Chapter 7, that sand and gravel were not
"minerals" but were "saleable minerals" reserved from sales of state land after the
implementation of the amendment. By 1999, this Court specifically held in Treasure Valley that
sand, gravel, and pumice were not reserved in sales involving I.C. 5 47-701 until after the 1986
amendment. But even if there was a mistake, the Slate cannot shield itself from claims of a
"taking" on the basis that it was ignorant of the very laws the Department is charged with
enforcing. Swifl Courtney & Reecher Co. v. United Slates, 111 U.S. 22, 4 S. Ct. 244, 28 L. Ed.
341 (1884), See also, Restatement of Restitution, Section 55, Comments B and C.
Moreover, the State admitted in its Answer that it expressly represented to Harris in 1985
that it owned the sand and gravel on the Forty Acres and that Harris needed a lease from the State
to remove it.88 Harris relied on those representations to their detriment. Idaho Law will not
86

88

R. Vol. V1, pp. 1109-10.
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permit the State to now deny responsibility for Harris's losses on the basis that they did not know
Harris was the true owner. "A party cannot falsely assert a fact to be true and induce another to
rely thereon to his prejudice, and thereafter hide behind the claim that he did not know it was
false at the time he made it." Estes v. Magee, 62 Idaho 82, 109 P.2d 631, 634 (1940) quoting
Haighv. White WayLaundvyCo., 1641owa 143, 145N.W.473,50L.R.A. (N.S.) 1091.
Even if the government was mistaken about its ownership, that fact is immaterial. If it is
determined that the State had, in fact, no right or title to the property, the Constitution of Idaho,
mirroring the Constitution of the United States, requires just compensation. This Court's recent
decision in C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Ilighway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003) is on
point. In C&G, the Canyon Highway District advised C&G, Inc. that, under a 1921 resolution by
the Canyon County Commissioners, the Highway District had an easement on 25 feet of each
side of the section line running through C&G Inc.'s farm. Based on that resolution, the County
believed it could use the fifty feet along the section line to build a public road. One principal
shareholder of C&G, Inc. objected to the construction of the road; the other participated in
different aspects of the project. Both believed the Highway District's representations regarding
the easement without investigating further. Construction of the road began in January 1992, and
the road was opened for use in May 1993. In January 1997, plaintiff approached a surveyor
about developing its property and at that time learned that there was no easement for the road;
plaintiff immediately filed suit against the Highway District, seeking damages for inverse
condemnation. On appeal, the parties did not dispute that the property was taken by the Highway
District. The Highway District took control over the 50 feet, and placed a roadway on it.
The central issue was whether C&G, Inc. should be barred from claiming compensation
from an undisputed inverse condemnation because they had waited until 1999 to sue for the
APPELLANTS' RNEF - 24

"taking" of the easement. The Idaho Supreme Court, in addressing C&G Inc.'s claim against the
government, focused on the impact of the government's mistaken belief that it had a right by law
to use the property:
Furthennore, the Highway District's erroneous belief it had an easement over the
section line caused the confusion in this case. It would be bad precedent for this
Court to condone the government's misrepresentation, albeit innocently mistaken,
by holding otherwise.

Id. 139 Idaho at 144, 75 P.3d at 198. Specially concurring, Justice Schwartzinan added "The
Highway District's misperception of its property rights (easement) should hardly inure to its
benefit ..." Id. 139 Idaho at 146, 75 P.3d at 200.
The ruling in C&G is consistent with the result reached by federal courts adjudicating the
specific issue of whether a government mistake or misinterpretation in the definition of a
"minerai" results in a compensable taking. The cases hold that the error, however innocent,
understandable, or long-held, and however effectuated,

does constitute

an unconstitutional

taking, unless justly compensated. The government's wrongful assertion of ownership of mineral
rights (even if based upon a good faith belief that the rights belonged to the government) deprives
the true owner of full ownership and occupation and the government must therefore pay damages
for the period of claimed ownership. Pettro v. United States, 47 Fed. C1. 136 (2000) (The Forest
Service argued that no taking had occurred since it's interpretation of title led it to believe it was
the owner and it merely entered orders pertaining to the ownership of the sand and gravel. The
U.S. Court of Federal Claims disagreed, finding a "taking" in the Forest Services attempts to
exercise ownership); Yuba Natural Resources, Inc., v. US., 821 F.2d 638 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(United States notified Yuba that it thought that Yuba's mineral rights belonged to the
government and demanded that Yuba stop mining. This constituted a "taking" by the government
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as the minerals were determined not to be the property of the government); Foster v. US., 221
Ct. Cl. 412, 607 F.2d 943 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 19791, @er remand 2 Cl.Ct. 426 (1983). (The
government's mistake concerning dolomite as a mineral and its requirement that the owner sign a
lease with the government to remove it, is a "taking" even though the govemment believed
dolomite was a reserved mineral.)
2.

The Mineral Lease Laclis the Elements of a Binding Contract.

The district court's ruling that the Mineral Lease bars all recovery for Harris is hinged on
its determination that the Mineral Lease was valid and enforceable from 1986-1999 and it
continues to be so today. The Mineral Lease, however, laclted consideration from the State, was
void under the doctrine of impossibility, was not supported by mutual intent, was signed by
Harris under duress, and is unconscionable. Any one of these flaws sufficiently invalidates
andlor voids the Mineral Lease.
a.

The Mineral Lease Was Not Suotlorted by Consideration

It is well-established that consideration is necessary for a valid contract. "Consideration
includes 'action by the promisee which is bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.'
It may also consist of a 'detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the promisor."' Lettunich v.
Key Bank Arat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368, 109 P.3d 1 104, I 109 (2005), qz~otingDaj) ir Mortgage

Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605, 607, 428 P.2d 52, 526 (1967) and Surety L$e Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel
Mortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 599,603,514 P.2d 594,598 (1973).
The court found that the consideration given by the State in exchange for Harris's 'quit
claim' of ownership rights and agreement to waive all rights of recourse was the State's good
faith belief of ownership and forbearance of the right to resort to the courts to settle the dispute of
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ownership.89 However, this was not a valid compromise. The State admits Harris signed the
lease alter they sent him letters demanding that he do so; the State did not, in fact, have a good
faith belief in its ownership rights in 1985 and 1986, when it made those demands. As pointed
out in Vane v. Towle, 5 Idaho 471, 477-78, 50 P. 1004, at 1006 (1897), "[a] compromise
presupposes a claim with at least some shadow of legality or equity to support it; neither of
which existed in this case. It was simply an assertion upon one side and ignorance or timidity or
both on the other." Moreover, the State

sue Harris for ownership. In a nutshell, Harris got

nothing in exchange for the State's use of their land and capital.
b.

The Mineral Lease Is Void by Im~ossibility

Since the State never owned the sand and gravel identified in the Mineral Lease, the State
could never provide to Harris "the exclusive right and privilege to mine ...sand and gravel" or
meet any of the other representations and covenants of ownership in the Mineral Lease. The
fundamental necessity of a lease is the ownership of the leased property by the lessor. Without
that vital piece, the basis of a lease bargain cannot be achieved.
Idaho courls have already spoken on the proper outcome where essential terms of the
contract turn out to be non-performable. Even if it is assumed--contrary to the evidence, as
argued above-that

the State did not know it did not own the sand and gravel when it entered

into the Mineral Lease, the fact that it did not so own the property voids the contract. Faria v.
Southwick, 81 Idaho 68, 72, 337 P.2d 374, 375 (1959) quoting Restatement of Contracts, volume

2, p. 847 (". . . a promise imposes no duty if performance of the promise is impossible because of
facts existing when the promise is made of which the promisor neither knows nor has reason to
know").
89

It has been long-established in Idaho contract law that "[wlhere parties make an

R. VOI.IV, p. 736 (July 20,2004 Order).
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agreement and are ignorant at the time that performance of the contract is impossible, there is no
contract, if it appears on the construction of the agreement that it was intended to be conditional
on the supposed possibility of performance." Id., quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts 5 462, p. 952.
Additionally, in Mecham v. Nelson, 92 Idaho 783, 451 P.2d 529 (1969), when a land
sale fell through, the sellers sued on the purchase and sale contract, seeking to have the contract
forfeited and to have the property at issue restored to them, with damages for unlawful detainer.
The buyers denied default and sought specific performance or damages. This Court reversed the
district court's ruling, which found the buyer in default and assessed damages against the buyer
as a hold-over tenant on the subject property. This Court held that the parties had entered into an
agreement, the performance of which was impossible. Because the evidence suggested that a key
provision was an essential part of their thinking when entering into the agreement, and because,
through no fault of either party, "the contract. . . proved unworkable," the Court ruled there was
a failure of a condition precedent and liability under the contract was therefore avoided by both
parties. Id., 92 Idaho at 787,451 P.2d at 533.
In Mecham, the circumstances turned out to be different than both parties expected and,
on. this basis, the Court reasoned, "we observe that the parties hereto entered into an agreement
which became impossible of performance. Performance was possible only by a radical change in
the agreed duty of the buyers. That duty had already been bargained for and they need not
assume more." 92 Idaho at 786-87,451 P.2d at 532-33. This same reasoning should be applied
to the case at bar. If the district court is correct and both parties mistakenly assumed that the
State actually owned. the property, and both parties believed the State had the authority to require
that Harris sign and comply with the Mineral Lease, then Meacham requires that the court "find
and fix the reasonable rental values of the respective properties for the period of possession" and
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"determine the value of any improvements made upon the respective properties, to allow all
proper credits and debits and render judgment accordingly." 92 Idaho at 788,45 1 P.2d at 534.
Under the doctrine of legal impossibility, neither Section 27 nor any other section of the
Mineral Lease is enforceable if the agreement is determined to be impossible of performance as
intended by the parties at the time of execution. Equity puts each party where they would have
been had the agreement not been entered into. Id. Since the Mineral Lease is invalid and
unenforceable, then the application of any of its provisions against Harris is inappropriate and
contrary to Idaho law. Section 27, therefore, cannot apply in this case to either prevent Harris
from seeking damages for the State's inverse condemnation, or to prevent those damages from
being awarded.
c.

The Mineral Lease Lacked Mutuality of Intent

The district court also appears to have misapplied the law concerning proof of intent.
Though he correctly cited the proposition that "the intent of the parties at the time of the
execution and the plain meaning of the language used controls the meaning of a lease," he
ignored all of the evidence, and the plain meaning, to determine intent?'

The court ruled: "In

executing the mineral lease, the [Department] surrendered a claim for trespass and damages in
exchange for the [Harris's] promise to pay rent and royalties on the sand and gravel.""

But

there is absolutely no evidence to establish the lease was intended, as the court suggested, to
"settle a dispute."92 The district court appears to have gleaned this intent from the facts that Mr.
Paul Keeton met with Linda Lou Johnson to discuss whether Harris was obligated to sign the
lease, and thereafter the lease was signed. The faulty rational is: Since Harris signed the Mineral
9".
91
92

Vol. IV, p. 736.
Id. at p. 737
Id. at 736.
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Lease which contained language exculpating the State from liability under the lease for claims of
refund, they must have intended to assume the State's duty to determine its ownership rights and
they must have knowingly and willingly waived their constitutional right to recourse if the State
was not the owner of the land it took. Since the State included this provision in the pre-printed
standard form lease, it must have intended to settle disputed rights with Harris.
The district court's Order states:
Section 27 provides: [ language of Section 27 omitted] ... In this provision
plaintiffs expressly assumed both the burden of investigating the defendants' title
and risk of losing any rents or royalties paid to the defendants in the event
defendants did not have good title. The intent of the parties at the time of the
execution and the plain meaning of the language used controls the meaning of a
lease. [Citation Omitted] in view o f the express term o f the lease, this Court
cannot conclude that it is unjust or inequitable for the defendants to retain the
plaintiffs' rent and royalty payments... .The fact that lai in tiffs executed the
leases indicates both parties believed defendants had a lepitimate claim to the
sand and rravel under the deed.93
To arrive at this conclusion, the district court had to entirely disregard the fact that the State itself
did not claim the lease was a settlement agreement. Froin the Answer and Counterclaim, through
the hearings on Harris's claiin under inverse condemnation, the State has not wavered: it required
the lease because it was the owner of the sand and gravel; its claim to ownership is based on the
self-executing power of the Land Board and the 1971 deed to the Estate of ~ i l e y . ~ ~
Next, even if Harris did believe the State had a legitimate claim of ownership, there is no
evidence that Harris (or the State for that matter) intended the lease as a means to bargain away
Harris's ownership rights. Rather, Harris signed the lease in direct response to the State's
representations and threats as indicated by (and as set forth in the Statement of Facts): (a) the
State's Answer and Counterclaim which admits the letters from the State to Harris informing
93

Id, at 735-736 (emphasis added).

9h
Vol.R
1, pp. .
69-79, 88-94 and 197-205; R. Val. V. pp. 935-936
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 30

them they were trespassing and of the State's intent to sue them-not
trespass-if

for ownership, but for

the Mineral Lease was not signed; (b) the affidavits of Paul Keeton and Sharon

I-Iarris concerning what the Department led them to believe about the State's rights and the
purpose and effect of the Mineral Lease; and (c) the letters from Sharon Murray and Director
Stanley Hamilton to Harris relating that the lease was required of Harris because the Department
considered the sand and gravel to be state property. There is no evidence whatsoever to support
the Court's conclusions that the Mineral Lease was the product of a negotiated settlement of a
dispute over ownership, or that Harris's lawsuit was simply a "Kings X maneuver by Harris to
get back from the State what they had freely negotiated away. In fact, not even the State's
version of the facts supports the district court's findings on this subject.95 There simply is
evidence on which to conclude that Harris was a "victim of his own conscious ignorance." If
either party is guilty of "conscious ignorance", it is the State.
Furthermore, the district court's findings on the "plain meaning of the language" of the
lease are also unsupported by the record. The court elaborated on what the "plain meaning" was:
Where the State asserted a colorable claim to title, which the plaintiffs acquiesced
in, the State's claim to the sand and gravel cannot be characterized as wrongful.
Section 27 can rightfully be read as a "put-up or shut-up provision." The
plaintiffs, having failed to "put-up" when the state asserted its right to sand and
gravel in 1985, are now constrained to e shut-^^."^^
Section 27 is identified as pertaining to title, but not to any form of transfer of rights or waiver or
limitation on the part of either party. Nothing about the placement, print, or wording of that
section draws attention to itself as either the ownership-altering or "duty to investigate
ownership" and "assumption-of-risk" paragraph the district court interpreted it to be. Section 27

95

R. Vol. I, pp. 69-80 (Answer and Counterclaim); and R. Vol. Ill, pp. 577-78.
74 1.

96 id., at
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of the Mineral Lease does not speak clearly and directly to the fact that by signing the Mineral
Lease, Harris is quit-claiming their land ownership rights to the State and relieving the State from
any liability for inducing him to do so by threats and misrepresentations of fact.
It appears the court simply did not consider: ( I ) the undisputed record that as of 1986, the
law had changed and the State itself was no longer claiming title in these situations and therefore
Linda Lou Johnson was not acting under a "colorable claim of title"; and (2) nowhere in the lease
is it even suggested that it is not a standard mineral lease, but really a "put-up or shut-up
agreement"; and (3) there is absolutely no evidence that the contents of Section 27 were ever
discussed between the parties, much less intended by either party as a settlement provision or
waiver-of-liability agreement; and (4) the Mineral Lease was a,form, and Section 27 was in the
fine print in the miscellaneous terms section near the end of the form-hardly

indicative of a

negotiated tenn.
The law does not support the district court's conclusion that it was not necessary to find
some meeting of the minds with respect to the meaning and operation of Section 27 in "the fine
print" of the Mineral Lease, particularly where that Section is construed to negate the express
representations of ownership by the State. It is a general rule of this state and the majority of
Arnerican jurisdictions that a party may contract. to absolve himself from certain duties and
liabilities under a contract subject to certain limitations. Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co.,
93 Idaho 496, 499, 465 P.2d 107, 110 (1970). However, it is nevertheless well-established that
courts look with disfavor on such attempts to avoid liability and construe sucll provisions strictly
against the person relying on them, especially when that person is the preparer of the document.
Anderson & Nqfiiger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 178, 595 P.2d 709, 712 (1979).
"Clauses which exclude liability must speak clearly and directly to the particular conduct of the
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defendant which caused the harm at issue." Id

Here, the district court disregarded the well-

established rules and found:
MS. DENTON: But, Your Honor, . . . I don't see how you can get to section 27
without first finding that the lease itself is valid and enforceable. . . . Now, what
your saying is that specific bequest, in the first paragraph of the lease] . . .is in
fact made worthless by section 27 of the terms and conditions of the back of the
lease . .
COURT: Well, this may be - this may be - this may be boiler plate, it may be
stock, but it's, in my estimation, good draftsmanship. It's good lawyering I think
on the part of the State to include this provision in the lease. And I tend to
reward good l a ~ ~ e r i n g . ~ ~
But good draftsmanship does not prevail over the intent of the parties and the Court's
determination that the Mineral Lease was intended to settle a dispute about ownership of the sand
and gravel rather than having the courts determine ownership98does not have support in the
record. To arrive here, the court must have supplanted the evidence relating to actual intent of
the parties and the evidence pertaining to the lease form, with inferences drawn outside of the
evidence. This was reversible error. As this Court found in Thomas v. Schmelzer, 118 Idaho
353, 359,796 P.2d 1026, 1032 (App. 1990), "the evidence in the record does not disclose that the
parties had a mutual understanding of the settlement agreement's effect and terms. In sum, the
evidence does not support the district court's finding that the settlement agreement was valid.
We hold that the agreement must be set aside due to insufficient evidence showing a meeting of
the minds." It is improper for the cowt to step in and iinply a waiver that the parties did not
.
Teton Council ofthe BSA, Inc., 144 Idaho 848, 172 P.3d 1123 (2007)
agree to. ~ t e e d vGrand
d.

Harris Sinned the Mineral Lease Under Duress

Though the court acknowledged the legal principle that where there is gross disparity in

''
"

Tr., pp. 90-91.
8.Vol. IV, p.736.
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bargaining power and exculpatory provisions in a contract are highly disfavored, he concluded
that there was no reason to apply those principles in this case because, once again, I-Iarris had
signed the Mineral

ease.'^

However, this was error because the Mineral Lease was signed as a

direct result of duress. The record establishes that Harris signed the Mineral Lease as a result of
the State's wrongful or unlawful demand that he do so. He had no other means of immediate
relief from the actual or threatened duress; he signed the Mineral Lease and submitted to the
State's control not as a voluntary participant but as a matter of compulsion.

Sw$ C. & B. Co. v. United States, 111 U.S. 22, 4 S. Ct. 244, 28 L. Ed. 341 (1884)
of the Internal Revenue
presents simiIar facts and relevant law. In that case the co~n~nissioner
Board misinterpreted a statute to require a certain type of reimbursement, in lieu of money, when
in fact, the correct interpretation of the law required reimbursement in money. After several
years of payment in the method required by the government, Swift objected to the Internal
Revenue Board's interpretation of the statute and sued for reimbursement.
Concerning whether the payments were voluntary, the lower court said:
The parties were not on equal terms. The appellant had no choice. The only
alternative was to submit to an illegal exaction, or discontinue its business. It
was in the power of the officers of the law, and could only do as they required.
Monev paid or other value parted with, under such pressure, has never been
renarded as a voluntary act within the meaning o f the maxim, volenti non fit
iniuria. Id. (Emphasis added.)
Notably, the Supreme Court here identified the Internal Revenue's misapplication of the law as
"illegal exaction" even though the procedure of paying in stamps was simply a mistaken
interpretation and long held practice of the agency. Id 11 1 U.S. at 29, 4 S. Ct. at 247, 28 L.Ed.
343. That is was a mistake, that it was without evil intent or was in good faith, was absolutely

99
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irrelevant. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the burden falls on the government to show
that the party from whom value was wrongfully taken due to a mistale in the govenunent's
interpretation of the law had agreed to waive its rights (in that case, a statutory right to a
monetary commission, in this case, a constitutional right to compensation for government use of
private properly):
[Ilit would be incumbent on the government, in order to deprive him of his
statutory right, not only to show facts from which an azreement to do so, that is
an apreement to waive his statutory rizht, mizht be infirred, but an actual
selbkment based upon such an understanding.
Id. 1 1 1 U.S. 25, 26, 4 S.Ct. 245, 246. 28L.Ed. 342 (emphasis added). Further, Swift's
acquiescence with the IRB's demands could not be viewed as a voluntary waiver of his
rights. Referring to the IRB's insistence that Swift comply or lose the ability to continue
in business, the Supreme Court said:
This was in effect, to say to the appellant, that unless it complied with the
exaction, it should not continue its business; for it could not continue business
without stamps, and it could not purchase stamps except upon the terms
prescribed by the commissioner of internal revenue. The question is, whether the
receipts, agreements, accounts, and settlements made in pursuance of that
demand and necessity, were voluntary in such sense as to preclude the appellant
from subsequently insisting on its statutory right. Id. 11 1 U.S. at 28, 4 S.Ct. at
247,28 L.Ed. at 343 (emphasis added).
The Court concluded that Swift could not be deemed to have voluntarily agreed to the payment
form because Swift and the government did not stand upon equal footing. Where the
commissioner claimed, under color of office, that the Internal Revenue's Bureau's actions were
proper under the law which the commissioner was charged to administer, Swift could not be
deemed to have voluntarily acquiesced therein.
In this case, just as in Swft, the State asserted under color of law that it was the owner of
the sand and gravel based on its interpretation of the statutes it was charged to administer (Title
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47, Chapter 7). Linda Lou Johnson insisted this interpretation was correct, Iong-established and
enforceable by the means she threatened. The district court found that "The State made various
threats against Harris in order to get them to sign the mineral lease..

Harris objected to the

State's claim but the unequal footing of the two parties is abundantly obvious and Harris
ultimately acquiesced. The State asserted its power to withhold entirely the sand and gravel from
Harris, completely denying them the right to conduct the business of selling the sand and gravel
and threatening to completely eliminate Harris from any compensation for the sand and gravel by
giving the Mineral Lease to the local highway department.

lo'

Harris had given no choice but to

sign the Mineral Lease and make payments as the State demanded. Therefore, the defense of
duress prevents enforcement of the lease against Harris

3.

Even if the Mineral Lease Were Valid, It Should Have Been
Rescinded for Mistake

Even if, arguendo, the Mineral Lease was actually valid, then it should have been
rescinded by the district court for Harris's mistake of fact regarding the ownership of the leased
property. "A mistake is an unintentional act or omission arising from ignorance, surprise, or
misplaced confidence." Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 27, 936 P.2d 219, 225 (App. 1997),
citing Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Ct.App.1983), citing
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS

5

1535 (3rd ed.1970). The mistake must be so substantial and

fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties. Dennett, 130 Idaho at 27, 936 P.2d at 225,
citing Bailey, 105 Idaho at 639, 671 P.2d at 1102. Here, the court already found that there was a
mutual mistake.
In cases of mistake, rescission-a11
loo

lo'

R. Vol V, p. 980.
See, R. Vol. 111, p. 594.
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equitable remedy aimed at restoring the parties to

their pre-contract status quo-is

appropriate. Murr v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 777,747 P.2d

1302, 1306 (App. 1987), citing, Blinzler v. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215, 485 P.2d 957 (1971),
overruled on other grounds, Barnard & Son, Inc. v. Akins, 109 Idaho 466, 708 P.2d 871 (1985);
see also 77 AM.JUR.2D Vendor And Purchaser

$5

538, 552 (1975); Restatement (Second) Of

Contracts 5 152 chapter 6 (1981); D. Dobbs, ITandbook On The Law Of Remedies

5 4.3 at 256

(1973). As the Idaho Supreme Court held in 1984, "it is the law that Courts have power to
reform contracts, or to rescind contracts and grant restitution where there is a mistake of law, a
mutual mistake as to a material fact, or a mistake of fact by one party where the other party knew
or as a reasonable person should have known of the mistake." Wolford v. Tankersley, 107 Idaho
1062, 1074 695 P.2d 1201, 1213 (1984). Thus, rescission and restitution should have been
awarded by the district court, and it was reversible crror to fail to do so.
4.

Even if the Mineral Lease Were Valid, It Is Unconscionable

A contract formed with lack of mutual understanding, failure of consideration, duress,
and under mistake, with disparate bargaining power between the parties renders that contract
unconscionable. Unconscionability has procedural and substantive components. See D. Dobbs,
Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution

5

10.7 (1973). "Procedural unconscionability relates to

the bargaining process leading to an agreement. It is characterized by great disparity in the
bargaining positions of the parties, by extreme need of one party to reach some agreement
(however unfavorable), or by threats short of duress. These circumstances taint the bargaining
process, producing a result that does not reflect free market forces.

Id.

Procedural

unconscionability is akin to, but somewhat less rigorous than, the familiar grounds for
invalidating contracts-such
mutual mistake. Id.
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as incapacity, fraud, duress, deceit, coercion, overreaching or

All of these elements are present in this case. There was no "bargaining" to this lease.
While Harris did ask Mr. Keeton to investigate the State's representations concerning ownership,
Mr. Keeton came back to them with further and more detailed elaborations concerning the State's
strength of ownership. That Harris accepted the State's claims is no surprise. The statements
were made under the full weight of the State's authority. Even Mr. Keeton, a representative of
the State of Idaho itself at the time, was convinced.'" There is ample basis on which to conclude
that overreaching or deceit, coercion and duress were all involved in obtaining Harris's signature
on the Mineral Lease. Therefore, this lease should have been set aside as procedurally
unconscionable.
Adequate grounds also exist to find that the Mineral Lease was substantively
unconscionable.

"This inquiry focuses on the agreement itself.

An agreement may be

unconscionable if it contains a bargain that "no man in his senses and not under delusion would
make on the one hand, and [that] no honest and fair man would accept on the other." Hershey v.
Simpson, 111 Idaho 491,494,725 P.2d 196, 199 (App., 1986) (citation omitted).
Moreover, the Mineral Lease was a contract of adhesion. "[A] contract of adhesion is a
standardized contract drafted by the party with stronger bargaining power, such that the weaker
~ . 4 ' ~
party has not choice other than to accept or reject it. Bruni v Didion, 160 ~ a l . ~ ~1272,
1291, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 395, 412 (2008). As an adhesion contract, the reasonable expectations of
Harris are relevant in the evaluation of its validity. See e.g., Bruni, supra, citing Fischer v First
Znternat'l Bank, 109 ~ a l . A ~ p . 41433,
' ~ , 1446, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 162 (2003) ("Although contracts of
adhesion are generally enforceable according to their terms, a provision contained in such a
contract cannot be enforced i f it does notfall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker or
'02

R.Vol. IV pp 745 and 755.
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'adhering' party"). Here, the district court interpreted the Mineral Lease as serving "in the
nature of a quit claim deed", and, by virtue that interpretation, detennined that the Mineral Lease:
(a) conveyed to the State ownership rights; (b) relieved the State from its constitutional duty to
investigate and determine its ownership of property before talcing it; (c) relieved the State from
its duty to pay just compensation if it is not the owner; and (d) released the State from any claim
of liability based on "the fine print." Harris, on the other hand, received absolutely NO benefit
from such an agreement. This interpretation of the Mineral Lease is not reasonable; it is outside
any ordinary and usual reading of that document; imposing duties on Harris that "no man in his
senses" would have accepted. Section 27, as interpreted by the district court, could not have
reasonably been expected or understood by Harris to function as the court found it did.
Furthermore, Section 27, as interpreted by the district court, resulted in a waiver of
Harris's constitutional rights. In Idaho, some statutory duties may be waived or exempted by
contract, other statutory rights and duties may not. Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 979,
695 P.2d 361, 364 (Idaho 1984). A waiver

oE the right to just compensation afforded by the

Constitution of the State of Idaho is an impermissibie w

a
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should not be upheld.
5.

Idaho Code 5 5-224 Does Not Bar Recovery

The district court ruled that Harris's claim for just compensation for the State's taking
prior to the execution of the lease, i.e. the promissory note and 1985 demands to stop selling sand
and gravel, were stale claims barred by I.C.

5 5-224.

Relying on precedent involving regulatory

takings, the district court compared the State's demand letters in 1985 and 1986 to the stop- work
orders issued by the county in the zoning cases of McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657,
851 P.2d 953 (1993) and Intermountain West, Inc. v. Boise City, 1 11 Idaho 878, 728 P.2d 767
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(1986). He comparcd the signing of the Mineral Lease-which
letters from the State-with

occurred after the two demand

the injunction issued after two stop orders in Intermountain West

(supra, citing, Tibbs v. City of Sanpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 603 P.2d 1001 (1979)), for the
proposition that the statute of limitations begins to run when substantial interference with the
plaintiffs property interest becomes apparent. The court ruled that the date of taking for the
1985-1986 period before the execution of the Mineral Lease was as early as the first demand
letter hut no later than April 1, 1986, the date the Mineral Lease was signed. "Because the
Harrises became aware of the full extent of the government's interference with the use and
enjoyment of their property no later than 1986, the applicable statute of limitations bars their
claiin for inverse condemnation before the initial period of the lease."lo3
The district court misapplied McCuskey, Intermountain, and Tibbs. It is not a question of
the number of demands/stop work notices received before the government takes the first actual,
controlling step that tolls the statute of limitations, or the date the plaintiff first knows of the
taking. It is a matter of the type of taking that is involved and the point when the consequences of
the government's actions "have so manifested thelnselves that a final account may he struck."
Unitedstates v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745,749,67 S.Ct. 1382, 1385,91 L.Ed 1789, (1947) The
situation must have become stabilized. "If suit must he brought, lest [the plaintiff] jeopardize his
rights, as soon as his land is invaded, other contingencies would he running against him -- for
instance, the uncertainty of the damage and the risk of res judicata against recovering later for
damage as yet uncertain.. ..And as there is nothing in reason, so there is nothing in legal doctrine,
to preclude the law from meeting such a process by postponing suit until the situation becomes
stabilized." Qro Fino Consol. Mines, Inc. v. United Slates, 118 Ct. C1. 18, 21, 92 F. Supp. 1016,at
'03

R. Vo1. VI, p. 11 12.
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1018 (Ct. C1. 1950).
In this case, the State's "taking" varied over the years from its "cloud of condemnation"
to barring Harris from access, prohibitions on building, establishment of government easements,
and regular lease enforcement. ( Even without actual intervention, the State's mere claim of
ownership created a cloud on Harris's title, depreciating its value. Accord Branca v. Ferrin, 10
Idaho 239 (1904). Materially lessening or interfering with another's enjoyment of its property is
a "taking" within the meaning of the Idaho Constitution. Powell v. McKelvey, 56 Idaho 291, 53
P.2d 626 (1935). Harris could not have lcnown at the commencement of the Mineral Lease the
full extent of his loss of use or enjoyment.
Moreover, the duty is not on Harris to determine ownership or when ihe decisive moment
of "taking" occurs. In C & G, Inc., Justice Pro Tem Schwartzman, relying on United States v.
Dickinson, supra., emphasized that the onus is on the government - not the private landowner.
"Certainly, in this case, the Highway District could have fixed the time when the property was
taken by instituting an action to condemn whatever interest C&G may have owned in the land.
However, it voiuntarily chose not to do so." C & G, Inc., 139 Idaho 140 at 146, 75 P.3d 194 at
200. In this case , as well, the district court found that "the Land Board had the ability in 1949 to
reserve sand and gravel to itself in perpetuity. It didn't do that."'04 Likewise, the State could
have appealed the 1958 and 1962 cases in which two different district courts decided sand and
gravel were not "minerals" reserved to the State; it could have filed an action for declaratory
judgment when it became aware of the potential issue, as early as 1937. Justice Schwartzman
went on to clarify that when the government chooses not to determine its ownership, equity falls
on the side of the private party:
lo'

Tr. p. 79, LI. 11-13
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Despite its choice not to institute condemnation proceedings, the Highway
District nevertheless asserts that C&G should be estopped from pursuing its
rightful claim even if that claim is not barred by the statute of limitations. ... In
effect, C&G was told to "go fight city hall" if it disagreed with the Highway
District's erroneous contention that it had an easement in the property and could
build a road upon it without paying just compensation. If any party should
receive the equitable benefit of an estoppel, quasi or otherwise, then I would
favor its being used against the Governmen[f]... C & G, 139 Idaho at 146, 75
P.3d at 200 (emphasis added).
Here, the district court ruled the opposite: it found that equity should operate against

Harris because Harris did not determine the State's rights of ownership.. .. they did not "go fight
city hall." The court concluded, "Here, Section 27 precludes a finding that equity and good
conscience require the defendants to return the rent and royalty payments made by the
plaintiffs."'05 The court explained at the hearing:
THE COURT: But you're suggesting in your submission that the State had an
obligation to determine what rights it had to this property.
MS. DENTON: In think there's case law to that effect, yes.
THE COURT:
And, I think paragraph 27 clearly puts that obligation on the Harrises' shoulders .
. . . 1think when you sign a lease, I don't' care if you say, oh, I didn't read it, oh,
I didn't understand it, oh, I'm sorry, that's what I meant by I'm a strict
constructist [sic], if it's in the lease and it's clear to me, I'm going to apply it and
I think it's clear to me.106....
The C & G opinion emphasizes that the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
expresses principles of fairness above all else and therefore "procedural rigidities should be
avoided.. . when the Government chooses not to condemn land but to bring about a taking by a
continuing process of physical events, the owner is not required to resort either to piecemeal or to
premature litigation to ascertain the just compensation of what is really taken." Id. citing

'05

'06

R.Val. IV, p. 735-736
Tr., pp. 90-91.
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Dickinson, 33 1 U.S. at 747-49; McDonald v. US. 37 Fed. CI. 110 (1 997) (when the defendant
allows a taking of land to occur by continuing events, a plaintiff may postpone filing suit until the
nature and extent of the taking is clear).
When the cause for delay in bringing an action csul be traced back to the government's
misrepresentation--even if innocently made---public policy requires that the statue of limitations
run from the & of the government's acts. To hold that a citizen has the right to compensation
for property taken by the State but then to allow no proper remedy for the recovery of the same,
"would indeed make the constitutional provision a hollow mockery instead of a safeguard for the
rights of citizens." Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d. 713,726, 123 P.2d 505 (1942).
This is consistent with McCuskey, where this Court held:
In determining when the cause of action for an inverse condemnation claim
accrues we note that while a taking is typically initiated when government acts to
condemn property, the doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the
proposition that a taking may occur without such formal proceedings. In such an
informal taking this Court has decided that damages for inverse condemnation
should be assessed at the time the taking occurs. The time of taking occurs, and
hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that the full cxtent of the
plaintiffs loss of use and enjoyment of the aropertv becomes aaaarent.
McCuskey, 128 Idaho at 216-217,912 P.2d at 103-104 (emphasis added; citations
omitted).
Thus, the District Court was right the first time when it ruled that:
The operative date for determining the statutc of limitations is the date the full
extent the impairment of use became apparent. Intermountain West, Inc. v. Boise
City (citation omitted). The date the Harrises first knew the full extent of the
nature and extent of damages caused by the State's inverse condemnation of the
property was, consequently, November 22, 1999."'
Finally, the purpose of statute of limitations is to avoid stale claims. This lawsuit is
hardly "stale". The Government claimed ownership and acted affirmatively to control the Forty
Acres from 1985 to 2007. The State actively took different steps in the direction of expanding its
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control and it collected rent and royalty payments as late as 1999. Moreover, it simply cannot be
ignored that the State filed a counterclaim & asserting ownership in this case in 2003. Harris
filed their lawsuit in 2002. Harris is within the statute of limitations.
B.

The District Court Erred In Ruling That Harris Is Not Entitled To Damages
Under Quiet Title Laws.

The next issue raised in this appeal is whether the District Court erred in ruling that
Appellants' only remedy for prevailing on their quiet title action is reformation of the deed. In a
footnote of the August 2, 2006 Memorandum Decision, the District Court held that Harris was
not entitled to any relief other than reformation of the deed in their quiet title claim. The court
based this decisioil on a 2001 Washington Court of Appeals case which held that, based on
Washington's quiet title statute, "Because a quiet title action is a claim for equitable relief,
damages are ordinarily not allowed." Kobza v. Tripp, 105 Wn. App. 90,18 P.3d 621 (2001). The
Washington statute provides that a plaintiff ''may have judgment in such action quieting or
removing a cloud from plaintiffs title . . . " (RCW 7.28.010), and based on that language, the
Washington Court determined that, because the Kobzas claim was not coupled with any other
action at law, the award of any damages was inappropriate. See Kobza, supra.
However, the district court's reliance on Kobza is misplaced. First, Washington's quiet
title statute is different from Idaho's.

Significantly, Idaho's statute does contemplate the

recovery of damages in quiet title actions.

Second, Idaho has specifically held that it is

appropriate to award damages in quiet title actions, and has specifically condemned attempts by
plaintiffs to quiet title in one action and seek damages for the adverse claim in a different action.

1.

Idaho's Statute Contemplates the Recovery of Damages, Where
Appropriate

Below is a side-by-side comparison of the quiet title statutes from Washington-relied
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on

by Kobza, which was then relied on by the District Court-and

Idaho's quiet title statute, the

governing law for this case.

--

.-.. .-.

\;I

Wsltington
... ... '
s Statute
7.28.010
Title 7. Special Proceedings and Actions
Chapter 7.28. Ejectment, Quieting Title
7.28.010. Who may maintain actions--Service
on nonresident defendant

Any person having a valid subsisting interest in
real property, and a right to the possession
thereof, may recover the same by action in the
superior court of the proper county, to be
brou~lltagainst the tenant in ~ossession;if
there is no such tenant, then against the person
claiming the title or some interest therein,
may have iudgment in such action quieting or
removing a cloud from plaintiffs title; . . .

--

--- --.

Iilalto's
--Szatrrte
.. .- .
.
.

. . .. ..

. ..

1

I.C. $ 6-401
Title 6. Actions in Particular Cases
Chapter 4. Quieting Title--Other Provisions
Relating to Actions Concerning Real Estate
5 6-401. Actions to quiet title

An action may be brought by any person
against another who claims an estate or interest
in real or personal property adverse to him, for
the purpose of determining such adverse
claim ... .

I S 6-404. Value of improvements as set-off.
when damages are ciaimed for withholding the.
property recovered, upon which permanent
improvements have been made by a defendant,
or those under whom he claims, holding under
color of title adversely to the claim of the
plaintiff, in good faith, the value of such
improvements must be allowed as a set-off
against such damages.

A review of the language of the Washington statute reveals the basis for the Kobza
Court's determination that the only remedy for a quiet title action in Washington is reformation
of the deed. In contrast however, Idaho's statute does not contain such a restriction of remedies.
Idaho's statute begins by discussing the right to bring the action itself. LC.

5 6-401.

While it

does not specifically list the possible remedies available, the language contained in the setoff
section, I.C.

3

6-404, clearly shows that the statute contemplates the possibility that damages

would be sought in quite title actions. The setoff section specifically provides that, "When

damages are claimed for withholding the property recovered", a setoff be applied to the
recovered damages in the amount any enhanced value that the adverse claimant added to the
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property. This language indicates that damages can be claimed in quiet title actions.
Furthermore, the statutes pertaining to limitation of actions also evidence the legislature's
intention to provide for other relief in quiet title actions. I. C. 5-214 governs action for recovery
of real property. But I.C. 5-215 provides a separate limitation period for actions for the recovery
of mesne profits of real property. And LC. 5-204 provides a distinct limitation period for
"actions arising out of claim to title or to rents or profits." I. C. 5-204 states that "no cause of
action, or defense to an action, arising out of the title to real property or to rents or profits out of
the same" may be brought unless there is possession of the premises within five years of the
bringing of the action or defense.
When interpreting a statute, the primary function of the Court is to determine and give
effect to the legislative intent Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. I$ousel, 140 Idaho 96, 90
P.3d 321 (2004), quoting George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797
P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990). Further, " '[iJt is the duty of the courts, in construing statutes, to
harmonize and reconcile laws whenever possible and to adopt the construction of statutory
provisions which harmonize and reconciles them with other statutory provisions.' " Housel,

supra, quoting, Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572, 798 P.2d 27, 31 (1990). If there is no
remedy for quiet title actions other than reformation of the deed, why are these code sections
necessary? More to the point, if no relief is available in actions arising out of title to real property
except reformation of a deed, why would X.C.5-204 address, in a singular fashion, "actions
arising out of the title to real property or to rents or profits out of the same"? This section
anticipates actions to quiet title in which rents or profits are claimed, as in the present case. The
district court erred in ruling that Harris was not entitled to a full recovery of its damages for the
State's inference with their rights to quiet title.
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2.

Idaho Case Law Permits the Award o f Damages in Quiet Title Actions

Moreover, the ability for a plaintiff in a quiet title action to recover damages where
appropriate has been long-recognized by Idaho courts. In 1936, the Idaho Supreme Court
rejected the argument that "recovery cannot be had, in a suit to quiet title, for rental value of
premises title to which is sought to be quieted." Western Loan & Building Co. v. Banded, 57
Idaho 101, 63 P.2d 159 (1936). That decision was based on the holding in Coleman v. Jiggers,
12 Idaho 125, 85 P. 894 (1906), which stated:
One of the objects of our practice act and the provisions of our state Constitution
in abolishing all distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and
giving our district courts full and complete jurisdiction both at law and in equity,
was to rid our system of a multiplicity of suits and a vexatious and cuinbersome
procedure, and to give litigants full and complete relief in a single action, where
under the old practice several suits were necessary to accomplish that
result.(Citation omitted.)
The Banded decision was later relied on in the 1957 case of Hodges v. Trail Creek

Irrigation Co., 154 F.Supp. 837 (D.Id. 1957) and was reiterated with specific reference to Idaho's
quiet title statute by this Court in 1983. In Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,668 P.2d 130 (1983),
the Court found that, when a plaintiff claims ownership of property in a quiet title action, he or
she does not claim it under one specific theory, but rather, claims it based on any legal theory that
would establish the claimed ownership. In Aldape, Plaintiffs had filed two quiet title actions, one
based on the theory of adverse possession and the other based on the theory of accretion. The
case is focused on the res ,judicata issue but the Idaho Court of Appeals noted a legal concept
important to the case at bar. "It follows that the plaintiff in a quiet title action does not merely
claim title by a specific theory, or assert that there is a specific defect in the adversary's title.
Rather, the plaintiff claims ownership, and he claims it upon any legal theory or set of probative
facts which may be employed to establish such ownership." Aldape, 105 Idaho at 260, 668 P.2d
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at 136.
Thus, contrary to the District Court's conclusion, both the statutes and Idaho case law
allow the recovery of damages in quiet title actions, where appropriate. In fact, seeking damages
from the adverse claiin in a subsequent action is specifically prohibited in Idaho. Here, Harris, in
addition to seeking reformation of the deed, also sought damages. The court incorrectly ruled that
Harris could not be awarded damages in its successful quiet title action without prevailing on its
other causes of action. The court compounded that erroneous ruling, as discussed in the following
sections, by then ruling in favor of Harris on his inverse condemnation claim, but still denying
damages under the eminent domain statutes and constitution.
C.

The District Court Erred in Ruling Sua Suonte on Harris Claim for
Eiectment and Ouster

Without stating a reason, the District Court treated Harris's and the State's cross-motions
for summary judgment on quiet title damages as though they were actually cross-motions for
summary judgment on Count 11 of Harris's complaint. Though Harris objected, arguing that
Count I1 was not simply a different form of relief for claims raised under Count I, as the State
asserted, but a separate cause of action requiring different evidence, and proof of different
elements, which Harris had not yet had the opportunity to brief or argue. Without the submission
of evidence or argument regarding this claim, the district court entered judgment against Harris.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) allows for the entry of summary judgment based on "the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any

. . . .,,

Substantively dismissing an entire claim for which evidence had not yet been presented or argued
should not have been within the court's discretion, and even if the district court had such
discretion, the order abused it by sua sponte dismissing Court 11 of Harris's Amended Complaint.
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Harris's claim under ejectment and ouster is a related but independent cause of action. A
cause of action to quiet title is not identical to a cause of action for ejectment and ouster. One
proves ownership and the other right to possession and it is not necessary to prove the latter in
order to obtain damages under the former. Moreover, the court's decision on the merits of
Harris's ejectnlentlouster claim was not sound. The court held that Harris was not entitled to
mesne profits from 1985 to 1999 because the State was in lawful possession of the property
during that timne.lo8 Mesne profits are a measure of damages in an action for ouster or ejectment.
Typically mesne profits are defined "as the value of the use or occupation of the land during the
time it was held by one in wrongful possession and is commonly measured in terms of rents and
profits." Dumas v. Ropp, 98 Idaho 61, 558 P.2d 632 (1977), citing Black's Law Dictionary, Rev.
4th Ed., 1968. Id. The Mineral Lease, the district court decided, conveyed possessory rights to
the State, precluding a claim of ouster; by virtue of the Mineral Lease, the State's possession was
not "wrongful. ,, 109
The district court's ruling raises more questions than it answers, however. The court had
already determined that the Mineral Lease conveyed ownership rights to the State by employing
its "lease-as- quit- claim- deed" analysis. Here the court construed the Mineral Lease as also
conveyingpossessory rights to the State. This is entirely inconsistent. A lease would nonnally
have placed lawful possession during the term of the lease in the lessee-in this case, Harris. Yet
the district court's ruling necessarily holds that this Mineral Lease was some kind of "reverselease" in that it placed lawful possession in the lessor, i.e., the State. If the district court is
correct that the Mineral Lease conveyed ownership and possession to the State, then under what

108

R. Vol. IV, pp. 735-41
at 74 I .

'09 la!,
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agreement did the parties intend to grant Harris the right to access and sell the sand and gravel?
The proper result was ihr the district court to prevent unjust enrichment arising out of the State's
tortious conduct and award Harris damages. Accord 230 Park Ave. Associates v. State of New

York, 165 Misc.2d 920, 928-29, 630 N.Y.S.2d 855, 860. (NY Ct. C1. 1995). Thus, judgment
against Harris on Court I1 should be reversed.
The District Court Erred in Denying Harris Attorney's Fees Below

D.

Harris is entitled to attorney's fees in the underlying case, on several grounds: I) Idaho
Code 3 12-117; 2) Idaho Code

5

12-121; and 3) the Private Attorney General ~ o c t r i n e . " Each
~

of these grounds provides a separate and distinct basis for the award of attorney's fees to Harris.
Idaho Code

3

12-117 is applicable to this case because this lawsuit is against the

Department of Lands and the State Land Board. Idaho Code 3 12-117 provides that:
In any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a
state agency and a person, the court shall award the person reasonable attorney's
fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds in favor of the
person and also finds that the state agency acted without a reasonable basis infact
or law. Section 12-1 17(4)(b) recites that "state agencyu means "any agency as
defined in section 67-5201(1)," which, in turn provides that:
"Agency" means each state board, commission, department or officer authorized
by law to make rules or to determine contested cases. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
This Court exercises free review over a district court's decision on an attorney's fees claim under
I.C.

5

12-1 17. In re Estate ofElliott, 141 Idaho 177, 108 P.3d 324 (2005). This Court has held

that the purpose of this statute is "two-fold: '(1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary
agency action; and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified
110

R. Vol. IV, pp. 757-58 (initial memorandum); R. Vol. IV, pp. 819-25 (reply memorandum); Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Costs and Fees, attached to Appellants' Motion to Augment Clerk's Record, filed with this
Court on April 30, 2008; and November 6, 2007, hearing transcript on Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs,
attached to Appellant's Motion to Augment Reporter's Transcript, tiled with this Court on April 24,2008.
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financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes
agencies never should have made." Rincover v. State, Dep't ofFin., Secs. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547,
549,976 P.2d 473,475 (1999) (quoting Bower v. Stale De-0%ofRevenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho
854, 859, 693 P.2d 1056. 1061 (1984)). If the Court determines that a party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law, an award of attorney fees under I.C. 6 12-117 is mandatory. Id.
Agency "actions" which give rise to attorney's fees under this section include disregarding a
hearing officer's decision and substituting independent findings based on agency perceptions,

Ater v. Idaho Bureau o f Occupational Licenses, 160 P.3d 438. 443 (Idaho 2007); relying on a
faulty interpretation of the law under circumstances where such reliance was unreasonable or
contrary to the law, In re Estate o f Elliott, 141 Idaho 177, 108 P3d 324 (2005); or the agency
action is contrary to or without legal authority. Accord, McCoy v. Dedt ofHealth & Welfare, 127
Idaho 792,797 (Idaho1995). The court looks to "the conduct of the other party to decide if that
party's activities can be characterized as having been unreasonably premised or undertaken upon
either a set of facts or under relevant legal principles applicable to the situation in which the
parties were engaged." Rincover, 132 Idaho at 550,976 P.2d at 476.
Here, the activities which must be reviewed for reasonableness are those which
culminated in this lawsuit; i.e. the Department's refusal in 1999 to reimburse all of Harris's
money and to pay hiin a reasonable amount for the lost use of his land. At that point, the State had
acknowledged that Treasure Valley resolved any outstanding issue with respect to ownership of
the sand and gravel and had waived any interest in I-Ianis's sand and gravel. Land Board policy
had, once again, explicitly directed that all outstanding issues be resolved "in favor of the surface
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owners.""'

But the Department blatantly disregarded these facts and Treasure Valley, supra.,

and once again, asserted title to Harris's property. Although the State insists that Treasure Valley
is distinguishable from this case because "that case addressed only the definition of 'minerals' in
Idaho Code 47-701, not a specific reservation of sand and gravel in a deed",'

' and "the State is

not relying on the general mineral reservation as set forth in Idaho Code 547-701 in the case at
bar as it did in Treasure Valley," but rather on the Estate of Riley deed itself,'I3 there is no
substantive difference in the State's cases. In Treasure Valley the State argued that the court must
interpret the language of the land sale certificate and deed but they must be construed in

.'

accordance with I.C. Section 47-70 1

l4

"So we're talking about statutory interpretation.. . .we're

back at 47-701 (sic) either way you look at it."

'I5

Therefore, under the State's own analysis, its

claim of ownership had already been decided in Treasure Valley. This conclusion is particularly
compelling in light of the State's admission, when asked by the district court in this case what the
words "including sand and gravel" were intended to mean in the Estate of Riley deed, that "[tlhe
Land Board obviously intended sand and gravel to be contained as part of the mineral

The conclusion that the State's counterclaim and defense were "unreasonably premised or
undertaken" is further bolstered by the circumstances of this case. This lawsuit arises out of the
Department's unwillingness or inability to enforce Land Board policy and failure to proactively
identify and uniformly correct state forms and procedures relating to sandlgravel ownership;

'I1

See ff note 5 1, supra.
R. Vol. I, pp 198-207

Id. at p. 199
~ r a n s c r i ~ont Appeal, before the Honorable D. Duff McKee, May 8, 1997, pp 17-18, attached to Appellants'
Motion to Augment Clerk's Record, filed with this Court on April 30,2008
Id. at p. 17
R. Vo1. I1 pp 304-305
'I3

'I4
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particularly where the land sale contract did not specifically reserve them. The result was that the
Department inequitably treated citizens differently, "correcting" some deeds but not others
without any apparent coordination or uniform criteria. This conduct fully and substantially
justifies an award of attorneys fees under I.C. $12-1 17.
Moreover, the Department acted without authority and outside of the law when it
arbitrarily reneged on its own 1999 written disclaimer of any interest in Harris's property, and
failed to abide by the Land Board's post- Treasure Valley policy that sand and gravel are not
owned by the State if the deed & certificate do not expressly reserve them."'

This last point

alone is grounds for an award of fees under LC.$ 12-117; it is per se unreasonable for the State to
pursue a counterclaim and defense o% ownership of Harris's property where such action is against
State policy and the sand and gravel has already been disclaimed.
To the extent fees are not awardable under I. C. 12-117, (accord Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho
569, 573-574 (1996), Harris alternatively claims attorneys' fees pursuant to the Private Attorney
General Doctrine. See Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 682 P.2d 524 (1984) Under this
Doctrine, the court must consider (1) the strength and societal importance of the public policy
indicated by the litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the
resultant burden on the plaintiff, and (3) the number of people standing to benefit from the
decision. Here, the broad public policy which the present litigation pursues is adherence by state
agencies to the legal advice provided to them by the state attorney general's office and the
faithful performance by state agencies of the policies, guidelines, and directives of the State Land
Board. The point of awarding attorneys fees in this case is to enunciate that the economic burden
must be on the State of Idaho when its agencies and representatives fail to take those steps any
'I7

R. Vol. IV, p. 642
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reasonable and prudent individual would take to ensure the proper documentation of a land sale.
Finally, Harris also claims attorney's fees under I.C. 9 12-121. As this Court is well
aware, under Idaho Code § 12-121, attorneys' fees can be awarded to the prevailing party. "The
determination whether a party is a prevailing party is committed to the discretion of the trial court
and we review that determination for an abuse of discretion." Mihalku v. Shepherd, --- P.3d ----,
2008 WL 820562 (Id. 2008), citing, Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving,
Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005), citing Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 65 P.3d 502,
(2003). Thus, the determination of an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code

5

12-121 is

also reviewed under that standard. See e.g., Beach Lateral Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 142
Idaho 600, 130 P.3d 1138 (2006). In this case, the district court found that Harris was the
prevailing party, but did not find that the State's case was pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation because the state prevailed in Harris's claim for darnages.'18 However, in
making this determination, the district court applied the wrong test. The question is not whether
the court is able to easily or quickly arrive at a decision, but whether the State pursed its case
unreasonably. The record is replete with instances of the Department being told over and over
again, in various contexts, of its lack of entitlement to sand and gravel pursuant to I.C. 9 47-701,
when such property was not reserved in the land sale certificate- yet it rested its case on
ownership. This is unreasonable. The district court's decision should be reversed.

IV.

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
In the event it is successful in this appeal, Harris also seeks attorneys' fees on this appeal

on the same grounds as those enumerated and discussed in the previous section: I.C.§§ 12-117,121 and the Private Attorney General Doctrine.

"'November

6,2007, hearing transcript on Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, pp. 22-23, attached to
Appellant's Motion to Augment Reposter's Transcript, filed with this Court on April 24,2008.
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V.

CONCLUSION
The district court's decision to deny just compensation to Harris based on Section 27 of

the Mineral Lease is not sustainable under the law or the facts of this case. The Mineral Lease is
not a "quit claim deed", it is not a "reverse-lease", it is not a "put up or shut up agreement," it is
not an interlocutory order, and it isn't even "good lawyering". It is a mistake, at best. It is not,a
legally enforceable bar to Harris's claim for inverse condemnation, quiet title, or ouster damages.
Harris urges this court to: I) reject the district court's flawed legal conclusions and factual
findings; 2) reverse the judgment denying Iiarris relief; 3) order entry of judgment in favor of
Harris for the liquidated portion of damages (see R. Vol. 111 pp. 557 and 578-580) plus prejudgment compounded interest to compensate for Harris's lost opportunity cost; 4) remand this
case for trial so a jury can determine the damages to be awarded to Harris under the inverse
condemnation statutes; and 5) order attorneys fees in the proceedings below, and on appeal.
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